Editor's Introduction: One evening in Moscow in late
September Steve Goldstein told us the history of the NSF
International Connections Program. We found it a
fascinating story of how the National Science Foundation for
less than a million dollars a year over a five year time frame
has done some pump priming and helped to grow an
infrastructure that has made the US a focal point for
international Internet connections. In November we asked
him if he would agree to a more formal interview ranging
from its origins to plans for a 1995 solicitation that will
replace the initial one of 1990.
COOK Report: What was the sequence of events that led to
the initial solicitation in 1990?
Goldstein: When I came to NSF in 1989 I had been working
for NASA and NASA funded astronomers were very
interested in reaching the database known as SIMBAD: (Set
of Identifications, Measurements and Bibliography for
Astronomical Data) maintained on a Univac computer in
Orsay near Paris. This is probably the world's finest database
of its kind. In order to get to it, they were making an x.25 call
and paying the French government a charge because the
database was created and maintained by a French
government agency. On this basis the cost to NASA
astronomers varied between $100 and $200 a search.
Not surprisingly NASA astronomers were interested in being
able to use an experimental line that NSF was funding to
support research work between Larry Landweber at
Wisconsin and Christian Huitema at INRIA in Sophia
Antipolis in southern France. They were developing protocol
translating gateways. Their objective was to develop a
gateway that would translate between TCP of the Internet
protocol stack and its equivalent layer in the ISO protocol
stack. Initially they decided on a simpler goal: translation
between the TCP and triple X protocols - X.3, X.28, X.29 and so on.
Before coming to NSF in the second half of 1989 I was anemployee of Mitre Corporation helping NASA on these
issues including some of the initial setup of the NASA
Sciences Internet. At this point you could reach the Simbad
database by using Transpac the French packet switched
network. NASA was cooperating with NSF, and in this
particular situation we also received the help of the French
government and in particular Christian Huitema who rigged
a gateway between his Internet node at Sophia Antipolis and
Transpac. Consequently by doing a telnet to Sophia
Antipolis, an astronomer could gateway in Transpac and go
up to Orsay to search the Simbad database. (By the way this
same database is now on the World Wide Web -
http://cdsweb.u-strasbg.fr/Simbad.html - one click and you are there.)
That was my introduction to the international stuff and I can
remember being at the International Astronomical Union
meeting in the Baltimore area where we did demos with dial
up modems at 1200 baud. So later in 1989 when I went to
NSF, the situation was that we had that line to France.
There was a line to the UK funded through JVNC and
another one to Nordunet. However the line for Larry
Landweber's project to France went directly from the
Princeton University Computer Center.
When Landweber's project was over he had little interest in
keeping the link alive. But by then because of the Transpac
gateway, people were coming to depend on the availability of
that line.
COOK Report: To reach the Simbad database or do other things?
Goldstein: Hard to say. All of a sudden there was this
international link to France that had taken on an operational
flavor. Not only for Simbad, but maybe for other things too.
When people found that the cost of Simbad searches for
which they had been paying $100 to 200 for declined to the
one to two dollar range because they no longer had the X.25
call to worry about, they became very interested in using the line.
So the idea at that point that hit me was let's see if we can
consolidate this and get one organization to manage
coordinate and engineer all of our international connections.
Consequently in the spring of 1990 after all the necessary
internal work and reviews were done, we went out with a
competitive solicitation to do just that. We had a panel
meeting in September and in record time we got the thing
awarded by the end of the year. We went from final
recommendations to the award in something like six weeks -
normally that could have taken six months.
COOK Report: Any particular reason why it was able to go so quickly?
Goldstein: Well - for example every time the people in the
Grants Office wanted to make changes in the wording of the
cooperative agreement, I'd run downstairs and do it on my
Macintosh and then run back upstairs and they wondered
how we could get our secretaries to turn things around so
fast. There was a lot of word noodling. But we kept a full
court press on and got the job done. The award was made
with an effective start date of January 1991 with a ramp up
time of a few months.
COOK Report: We have heard someone at NSF say that you didn't
expect a bid from an IXC and that when one came in you were delighted. Comments?
Goldstein: Traditionally the kinds of proposals that we would
get would be from organizations like Merit. In other words an
academically based organization that would involve an
alliance with some kind of a telecommunications service
provider in the package but usually as a sub awardee of the
main awardee. For example in the NSFnet backbone MCI
was a participant but the grant went to Merit. In this
particular case Sprint had made a conscious decision that it
wanted to do the value added stuff and it bid with Cornell
University as a sub-awardee to do the Network Operations
Center work. This was surprising because we just didn't
normally get those kinds of bids. When after evaluation we
made the award to Sprint we were delighted that yet another
carrier was playing in the game. Because the NSFnet
backbone was MCI we wanted to encourage as many
telecommunications providers as possible to be in the game.
We were equally pleased when AT&T became an InterNic awardee.
For Sprint it was a learning experience. They had picked a
strong group at Cornell to do the operational management.
Mark Oros was leader of the Cornell team. While the Cornell
people did excellent work, Sprint after about a year migrated
the NOC to the Washington DC area in full cooperation with Cornell.
COOK Report: How would you evaluate the reason for the move to Washington by Sprint?
Goldstein: Well, I think after doing this for a while Sprint
realized that there was a real market there for a service that
they could provide. If it was just going to be two circuits -
one to Stockholm and the other to Paris, they probably would
have left it that way in perpetuity. But they said: A hah! We
see a real business opportunity here. And in so doing they
credited us with helping them spawn a new line of business.
The next big thing to happen - roughly in 1992 was that
NASA, NSF and DARPA were cooperating on a circuit we
called the "fat pipe" to the UK.
COOK Report: Fat was T-1?
Goldstein: No I think it was 512. And at any rate by consent
among the three of us we switched that over to the
cooperative agreement with Sprint and Sprint began to manage that.
And then at some point later in 1992 some other countries
that wanted to join the Internet got wind of things that
Sprint was doing for us as International connections
manager. Also for them the Internet meant the United States
because so many of the resources that were on the Internet
were located here.
Also there is another very stark reality that says every
international circuit is paid for as though it were two half
circuits. And each half circuit is paid to the
telecommunications provider in each of the two respective
countries. Moreover each of the two parties will have a
different tariff rate for the half circuit. It is almost always the
case that the other country's service provider charges a lot
more than the US service provider - if for no other reason
than since the 1984 break up we have a lot more competition
here in this country.
COOK Report: So if you can get an American half circuit
into the equation and you can get to the Internet by coming
here you can essentially get to the world and lower your costs
by connecting to the US?
Goldstein: Right. Cheaper than almost any other way of
doing it anywhere. Now an example of one the greatest
differentials that I can think of is a 64 kbs circuit to
Indonesia. The US half of the circuit is something on the
order of $3500 a month and the Indonesian half is roughly
$8500 a month. If they were to connect anywhere but the US
they would still pay $8500 a month for the Indonesian half
and 4 to 6 thousand a month for that other country's half circuit.
So both because of the Internet activity here and because of
our favorable international tariffs, the US became the best
place to come. Also because of the infrastructure we were
building with Sprint it was a logical place to connect. At this
point everything was being done in the Washington area.
MAE-East was formed around this time (late 92). One thing
attracted another and you soon had a snowball effect in late
1992 or early 1993.
When at about this time Sprint did its SprintLink kick off it
established a node in Stockton California. As a result they
began attracting Pacific countries. I think Maylasia was one
of the first ones. So a Pacific country could come into
Stockton and then come over SprintLink and get to the East
Coast where packets could be passed off to the other Federal
networks at FIX East. Eventually they also connected to FIX
west. But regardless, when you connected to SprintLink, you
were in the Internet. European countries tended to come into
Sprint's router at MAE-EAST and Pacific Rim countries into Stockton.
The Florida Connection
The key thing to understand here is that all these countries
were connecting at their own expense - almost. And here's
the almost. In December 1991 we had a meeting in
Guadalajara Mexico of Latin American countries interested
in connecting to the Internet. These countries were attracted
to PanAm Sat because its rates which were cheaper than
Intel Sat's. We said if enough of you want to come in at
PanAm Sat, we will ask Sprint to extend the connection down there.
We got plenty of takers. Consequently Sprint put in a router
right at the PanAm Sat teleport in Homestead Florida with a
dedicated T-1 to the Washington POP. It was supposed to go
in right before Hurricane Andrew hit. After the hurricane it
was January of 1993 before the teleport was able to do the connect.
Sprint came in with an elaborate cost recovery formula just
to pay for the T-1 link. When we examined the formula we
felt that it was hopelessly complicated and that it would
create problems with our internal people every time we
wanted to bring in a new country. We asked Sprint to bundle
the cost and come up with a single average figure. Sprint
agreed and in doing so took a risk of losing money if fewer
countries connected than they predicted. And in fact for the
longest time only two countries connected. Ecuador was first
and then Costa Rica. When the others saw the first connects
they knew it was real and started working on their own
governments. Soon there was another snowball.
COOK Report: Did NSF kick in some initial seed money?
Goldstein: No. All we did was once their signal landed in
Homestead we paid Sprint what we came to call a port
management fee. This was the bundled average fee for them
to recover the cost of bringing the signal to Washington,
paying for the router in Florida and managing the
connection. This fee became traditional so that when some of
the other countries connected elsewhere - for example when
Maylasia connected on the West coast we agreed that we
would pay that port fee.
Earlier this year after we had paid Sprint on the order of 10
or 15 port fees, I asked Sprint to take a look at that charge
again because it seemed that we had quite a nice snowball
effect going. Sprint agreed and voluntarily lowered their rate.
I think it has been a very successful collaboration. They took
risks on certain things and were very very good partners.
COOK Report: But what did the port fees finally cost? $500
a month? $900 a month?.
Goldstein: I'm not sure that the exact amount should be
advertised. I think that may be Sprint's business.
COOK Report: In comparison with the total cost of the
satellite link were they at least an order of magnitude less.
What was the rational for spending Federal funds?
Goldstein: Yes. The reason for this program was to serve the
needs of the research and education community. Scientific
and educational collaboration now is global. Of course there
are countries that can be considered as research or academic
"hot spots." And there are some countries where
collaboration opportunities for US scientists are somewhat
more iffy. So in terms of some real hot spots where we would
be willing and able to make major investments - given a very
limited budget - we were sharing the actually costs of some
links. But with very limited money there were other countries
where we could see nice opportunities for collaborations. In
these case there were no funds to share link costs but at least
as a courtesy to these countries we could provide some help
by paying the port fee.
COOK Report: But where did these port fees fall within the scope of the cooperative agreement?
Goldstein: Prior to our bringing the UK Fat Pipe under theICM Cooperative Agreement, the NSF Office of General
Counsel reviewed the request and the solicitation and
determined that it was global and not limited to France and
the Nordic countries. The individual port fees were, and still
are, approved by our Grants office (now the Division of
Grants and Agreements) as an element of the ICM Annual Program Plan.
If a foreign country had connected directly to a US service
provider the country would have paid rates (usually in the
form of membership fees) greater than what Sprint was
charging us. On the other hand I know of a few instances
where US providers were allowing connections at no charge.
This was merely a business decision that some service
providers were making. In effect the Sprint port fee was like
the annual ten to twenty thousand dollar membership fee
that regional networks would charge. What we were paying
Sprint was less than most of the annual membership fees we knew about.
COOK Report: At the end of 1994 about how many foreign
countries are coming in through Sprint?
Goldstein: About 40. Others come directly into national
providers or regional nets. Singapore and Taiwan into JVNC
for example. Thailand and one Indian network into UUNET,
Chile into Suranet, Israel into Nysernet. Also, many
countries connect to NASA Science Internet or the Energy
Sciences Network.
COOK Report: If there are a total of 80 or so nations with
direct TCP/IP connectivity. Looking at what you have
enumerated and subtracting one assumes that quite a few
nations must be hooked directly to service providers in
Europe or Asia?
Goldstein: Yes Egypt is one example. It connects to France.
As a matter of fact a colleague in Egypt called me up about a
connection to the US and I said, "Don't get me wrong. I don't
want to discourage you. We'd be glad to have you connect,
but you already have a connection to France and if you don't
have enough bandwidth it would probably be more cost
effective for you to increase the bandwidth of your French
connection. You don't need to have a line here because we
aren't the center of the universe." So they did increase their
French connection. At the time we had a T-1 into Paris.
Now we have three megabits into Paris.
COOK Report: So how did that increase in bandwidth to
Paris evolve?
Goldstein: Its like roads onto a freeway. You add more lanes.
Two weeks or two months later they're crowded. So you add
more lanes and soon it gets crowded again. We had a T-1
that was getting congested. Then we got an E-1 in and were
going to tear down the T-1. But the E-1 looked like it would
become rapidly congested and the E-bone found a
commercial customer and suggested that we share the T-1
between research and commercial customers.
The E-bone
COOK Report: But what is E-bone?
Goldstein: E-bone was at one point called the European
backbone. It was an ad hoc consortium of European networks
that created a backbone infrastructure. At one point the
original organization was followed by a phoenix like rebirth
of the "new" E-bone. The new Ebone is not to be confused
with the old ebone which had about five nodes. Links
between the nodes were paid for by a pool. Since then Europe
also has this Europa Net (European Multi- protocol
Backbone Service - EMPB) managed by an organization
called DANTE. E-bone and EuropaNet are competitors in a
sense. E-bone is a good deal smaller, but still it has nodes in
Paris, Austria and elsewhere. EuNet may have been a part of
the original E-bone operation but I don't think they are a
part of the new operation.
The customer that French have I think is an E-bone
customer. When we originally implemented 768 to
Stockholm, 256 was subscribed to by commercial users one
on the US side and one on the Nordic side. We did that on
purpose. It was done in such a way that we were sure that we
would get at least as much bandwidth as we were paying for.
The way this was done was that the commercial customer
entered the Trans Atlantic circuit with a serial line rated at
256 kilobits which meant that 256 KBS was they maximum
they could pump. On the other hand we saw the entire 768.
We could burst across that entire bandwidth. Since then the
line grew to E-1 while we are still doing the sharing with
commercial providers. This was done by conscious design,
because the eventual direction of things seems to be that the
international service will be provided by general commercial
providers as is now the case in the US.
COOK Report: Well this gets into the question of the next
solicitation. We'd appreciate hearing what you can say about it.
Goldstein: OK To recap. We are now in year 4 of a 5 year
cooperative agreement with Sprint. We have two E-1s to
Stockholm, two E-1s to London plus a T-1 to London - the
T-1 is now shared by ARPA and NASA. We have an E-1
and one megabit of a T-1 to Paris. There is every indication
that we will keep hitting congestion and have to add more
bandwidth. In addition there are a number of countries that
are connecting to this infrastructure that Sprint built with
ICM and under its own SprintLink initiative. In many cases
we are paying at our discretion a port management fee on
behalf of those countries which are paying the total cost of
their actual links to the US. A lot of these circuits are 64
kilobits but a lot are also congested. A very interesting
indication of what could be a trend is Maylasia that started
with 64 kilobits and plans now to upgrade in one step to T-1.
I think we'll see more of this. South Africa is now at 128 and
they are looking at the possibility of doing at least 256 and as
soon as they can afford it T-1 or E-1.
There seems to be no end in sight. There is however a finite
budget that we have to spend on this.
Money Spent and the New Solicitation
COOK Report: Are there any figures that you could give on
the total amounts that you have spent in the program?
Goldstein: Well I haven't added it up. We started the first
year at maybe $100,000. Ramped up to about a half million
and then last year were roughly $700,000. And this year
about 1.2 million I think. Almost all of this is for Trans
Atlantic circuits. By the way we are getting nicely discounted
prices from Sprint on them.
As we look at the future the problem is that the community
we are serving is no longer going to be served by a well
defined NSFnet backbone. Instead service will be spread out
over several general purpose backbones. Thus the question
becomes how we identify AUP (Acceptable Use Policy)
traffic from this community to estimate in any rational way
the cost of international service? We don't have packet
counters that can distinguish between AUP acceptable
packets. When traffic entered the ICM pipes from the
NSFnet backbone, we could say that it was AUP clean. With
no NSF backbone and traffic being aggregated at AUP free
NAPs to be shipped overseas we can no longer distinguish
between R&E traffic and that of Chase Manhattan Bank or
other commercial users.
Remember that DANTE is the organization that runs
EuropaNet. They have just announced that they are
removing AUP restrictions from their backbone. My guess is
that sooner or later in Europe there will be general service
provision of backbones just as we have now in the US. What
I am saying is that in the not to distant future - and I don't
know if we are talking one three or five years - but certainly
within that time frame a lot of the so called R&E community
in Europe will be served by general purpose providers just as
the R&E community will now be in the US.
In this kind of situation it doesn't make any sense for the US
government to stay in there and maintain its own
intercontinental links and with the exception of Scandinavia,
England and France we really aren't doing that anyway. We
are doing some cooperative funding with Mexico on their
link, but they are paying by far the lions share. We have a
little bit of assistance to South Africa, largely due to the fact
that they are relaying mail from neighboring countries.
COOK Report: So how does this all focus on the solicitation
that I believe you are working on?
Goldstein: Well I have ideas. But at this point I really have
no way of know what is going to come out after all the
necessary internal reviews. As to when? We hope it is going
to come out very very early in calendar year 95.
COOK Report: It sounds like you are hinting that when it
does come out one can expect a phased ramp down in direct
support of what are now commodity level international
connections? Is that a fair assessment?
Goldstein: Yes. One can expect that one element of the
solicitation will be a transition for this kind of connection to
be funded in some other way than by NSF. Now on the other
hand we do expect to be involved in links support high
performance kinds of activity. these would be of a
pre-tariffed experimental nature.
COOK Report: International analogs of the vBNS here in
the US?
Goldstein: Yes. There are some high speed networking
experiments in various parts of Europe and maybe Australia.
There would be an interest in being able to do high
performance applications cooperatively with research
interests in other countries. We would need intercontinental
links to be able to support those.
Also new technology promises to make available the
capability of being able to provide Internet services to people
on remote or mobile platforms. The metaphor might be
"World Wide Webb to the Rain Forest" and also to platforms
such as oceanographic research vessels. I am not sure at this
point whether this would fall into the same solicitation or
whether it might go as a separate solicitation. Lets just say
that we are looking for an appropriate means of serving
remote and mobile applications that have here- to-fore not
been feasible.
Randy Bush, John Klensin and Program Autonomy
COOK Report: Let's close with a couple of footnotes. How
does Randy Bush fit into the international picture?
Goldstein: We made an award for Network Startup Support
to co- PI's Randy Bush and John Klensin (John was then at
the International Food Research Center, housed at MIT; he
has since joined MCI). The grant paid for a small amount of
John's time as a contributor to various startup activities in
the IETF framework and for Randy's network (RAINnet)
connection to the Internet (first via Alternet and later
through SprintLink). Randy and John run a Gopher hole
(gopher.psg.com) and Web site (www.psg.com) on which
they have placed a lot of information that is very much in
demand for network startup activities, both domestic and foreign.
Randy's work has been pro bono as regards anything but the
network connection. And, indeed, Randy continues to accept
assignments to help network startup activities by rolling up
his sleeves and connecting the wires and configuring the
routers and servers, often at much less remuneration than
what he has to charge as an independent object-oriented
programmer consultant in order to put bread on his table. He
has been a key player in startup activities in Peru, Indonesia,
Guinea and Sri Lanka, to name those known to me, and he
also runs a UUCP relay site for other international networks
not yet on the Internet (he did this for South Africa before
we could accept their traffic--due to the international
embargo on South Africa--and for Peru before they got
their own Internet connection, for example). Our annual
grant for this activity is in the neighborhood of $50,000 (for three years).
COOK Report: To sum up then: your record for connecting
the world over the past years has been quite impressive. We
wonder however to what extent you have been able to do this
with complete independence of other arms of the Federal
government such as, for example, the State Department?
Goldstein: There has been much informal consultation
among the various agencies, and formal inquiries to the
Commerce Department's Export Administration in the
COCOM days. And, we certainly are guided by the positions
of the State Department, as in not routing traffic from
terrorist states. But, we have not applied to State directly for
permission to route traffic from any country (though NSF
has sought State's advice on occasion). Nor do we think it
would be wise to establish such a precedent. In the case of
Cuba, we applied for a license to route its traffic on the
NSFNET backbone and in the Regionals from the
Department of the Treasury, which administers the Trading
with the Enemy Act. Treasury coordinated it with State and
other government agencies, as did Commerce when we asked
for advisory opinions about Russia, for example. (By the way,
Treasury ruled that we did not require a license under the
provisions of TWEA, so we are free to route any
AUP-compliant Cuban traffic that may be presented to us.)
COOK Report: Perhaps the best known example was the
listing of Russian IP sites in the MERIT policy routing data
base?
Goldstein: This was done after consulting with the Export
Administration which raised no objection.
COOK Report: Any other examples?
Goldstein: Well, there are some that go the other way. For
example, though Iran is routed in Europe, we declined
requests to route Iran on the NSFNET Backbone. We made
the decision based on the State Department's having
classified Iran as a terrorist state (and some
well-remembered TV newsreels of the American Embassy
and its inhabitants in Teheran.